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Eighth Circuit Trademark Opinions
Abstract
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals’ trademark jurisprudence has been truly fair and balanced since the 1946
passage of the Lanham Act. The court has created this fair and balanced jurisprudence by creating firm
standards and sticking to them. Although not the most popular circuit in which to find a trademark case, the
Eighth Circuit has kept a constant vigil to assure that trademark plaintiffs do not dominate over trademark
defendants. This balanced approach to trademark law is consistent with the Minnesota Supreme Court, which
recently held that “advertising injury” included trademark infringement, and therefore the defendant’s
insurance carrier had to defend a trademark infringement lawsuit against it. The Eighth Circuit appears
mindful of the need to maintain an even playing field so that trademark owners’ rights can be respected but
trademark defendants’ ability to compete is not unduly burdened. This conclusion is supported by the
heightened scrutiny of secondary meaning, the improbability of finding a trademark diluted, the strict
standard on infringement, the consistent application of the incontestability doctrine, and by the data
regarding reported success rates of trademark infringement cases. In the end, this article concludes that the
Eighth Circuit’s trademark jurisprudence will lead to further and faster economic recovery than other circuits
because the courts protect legitimate trademark rights but not at the expense of competition.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals’ trademark jurisprudence 
has been truly fair and balanced since the 1946 passage of the 
Lanham Act.1  The court has created this fair and balanced2 jurispru-
dence by creating firm standards and sticking to them.  Although not 
the most popular circuit in which to find a trademark case,3 the 
Eighth Circuit has kept a constant vigil to assure that trademark 
plaintiffs do not dominate over trademark defendants.  This balanced 
approach to trademark law is consistent with the Minnesota Supreme 
Court, which recently held that “advertising injury” included trade-
mark infringement, and therefore the defendant’s insurance carrier 
had to defend a trademark infringement lawsuit against it.4  The 
 
       †   Professor of Law and Director, Intellectual Property Institute, William Mitchell 
College of Law.  Tony Noss ('10) provided expert research assistance on this piece. 
 1. Lanham Act, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1051–1141n (Supp. V 2005)).    
 2. AL FRANKEN, LIES (AND THE LYING LIARS WHO TELL THEM): A FAIR AND 
BALANCED LOOK AT THE RIGHT (2003).  (Pun intended.  I teach at a law school in 
Minnesota.  Al Franken is now a United States Senator from Minnesota.  Minnesota is 
in the Eighth Circuit.  I argue here that the Eighth Circuit has a balanced view of 
trademark law.  Maybe any pun you have to explain is not worth making.)    
 3. See KENNETH L. PORT, MITCHELL STUDY ON TRADEMARK LITIGATION (2008), 
http://www.wmitchell.edu/intellectual-property/files/WM-TMStudy-GraphT.pdf.         
 4. Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis. v. Wozniak Travel, Inc., 762 N.W.2d 572, 579–80 
(Minn. 2009). 
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Eighth Circuit appears mindful of the need to maintain an even 
playing field so that trademark owners’ rights can be respected but 
trademark defendants’ ability to compete is not unduly burdened.  
This conclusion is supported by the heightened scrutiny of secondary 
meaning, the improbability of finding a trademark diluted, the strict 
standard on infringement, the consistent application of the incontes-
tability doctrine, and by the data regarding reported success rates of 
trademark infringement cases.   
In the end, this article concludes that the Eighth Circuit’s trade-
mark jurisprudence will lead to further and faster economic recovery 
than other circuits because the courts protect legitimate trademark 
rights but not at the expense of competition.5 
II. SECONDARY MEANING 
The Eighth Circuit’s most significant role, perhaps, has been in 
secondary meaning jurisprudence.  The Eighth Circuit has a relatively 
narrow view of this topic.  Secondary meaning is an extremely 
important concept in trademark law.6  Some marks are said to be 
inherently distinctive.7  Examples of inherently distinctive trademarks 
include marks that are coined (Kodak or Sony), or marks that use an 
existing English language word in a unique and arbitrary manner 
(Apple).  Such marks are distinctive from the date of conception.8 
Most marks are not so lucky.  Most marks consist of an existing 
English word that over time comes to indicate source, but still 
possesses the original English meaning.9  When such words have two 
meanings, the source denoting meaning and the original meaning, 
they are said to have secondary meaning.10  Words with secondary 
 
 5. See infra Part VII.  
 6. See Frosty Treats, Inc. v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am., Inc., 426 F.3d 1001, 
1005 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Co-Rect Prod., Inc. v. Marvy! Adver. Photography, Inc., 
780 F.2d 1324, 1330 (8th Cir. 1985)) (defining secondary meaning as “an association 
formed in the minds of consumers between the mark and the source or origin of the 
product,” and illustrating how the question of secondary meaning is essential to 
determining whether a descriptive mark warrants protection). 
 7. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992) (holding 
that marks that are found to be “suggestive,” “arbitrary,” or “fanciful” are inherently 
distinctive because they naturally “serve[] to identify a particular source of a 
product”). 
 8. Id. 
 9. See Viacom, Inc. v. Ingram Enters., 141 F.3d 886, 891–92 (8th Cir. 1998) 
(noting that the word “BLOCKBUSTER” may indicate source as a trademark, but it 
also possesses multiple meanings in the English language). 
 10. See 74 AM. JUR. 2D Trademarks and Tradenames § 58 (Supp. 2009). 
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meaning are appropriate for protection in the United States as 
trademarks.11 
Each circuit has adopted its own test for secondary meaning.  
Although similar, they are not entirely consistent.  In the Eighth 
Circuit, direct testimony from consumers or survey evidence is 
important, but other factors include “the exclusivity, length and 
manner of use of the mark; the amount and manner of advertising; 
the amount of sales and number of customers; the plaintiff’s estab-
lished place in the market; and the existence of intentional copy-
ing.”12 
Sometimes this inconsistency creates dispositive results, as it did 
in litigation regarding the ubiquitous (in Wisconsin) cheesehead 
hat.13  Ralph Bruno, creator of the so-called “cheesehead hat,” sued a 
competitor in the Eastern District of Wisconsin for making a very 
similar hat out of foam in the shape of a wedge of orange cheese.14  
This was precisely what Bruno had created.   
The product had been remarkably successful for Bruno.15  Signif-
icant evidence existed in the record to conclude that the product had 
been successful.16  However, the district court found that product 
success alone was not “useful in establishing secondary meaning.”17  
For this proposition, the court relied on Aromatique, Inc. v. Gold Seal,18 
a case from the Eighth Circuit.  For this narrow proposition on 
secondary meaning, the court—which is located in the Seventh 
Circuit19—reached out to Eighth Circuit precedent to find the hat 
lacked secondary meaning, 20 even though the relevant precedent in 
 
 11. See generally 1-2 ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 2.09 (2009). 
 12. Frosty Treats, Inc. v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am., Inc., 426 F.3d 1001, 1005–
06 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 13. Foamation, Inc. v. Wedeward Enter., Inc., 970 F.Supp. 676 (E.D. Wis. 1997). 
 14. Id. at 682. 
 15. Id. at 688.  To anyone familiar with the rabid devotion of Green Bay Packers 
fans, this should come as little surprise. 
 16. Id. (the hats were ubiquitous in video evidence presented of Green Bay 
Packers home games, in high demand at the site of the 1997 Super Bowl in which the 
Packers competed, and allegedly received extensive media attention). 
 17. Id. at 688–89 (quoting Aromatique, Inc. v. Gold Seal, Inc., 28 F.3d 863, 873 
(8th Cir. 1994)). 
 18. 28 F.3d 863, 873 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 19. U.S. Courts, Circuit Map, http://www.uscourts.gov/images/CircuitMap.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 9, 2010). 
 20. Foamation, 970 F.Supp. at 688 (holding that evidence of the success of a 
product cannot “provide the basis for an inference of secondary meaning because 
something other than the secondary meaning of the trade dress may have been 
responsible for the success of the product”). 
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the Seventh Circuit would have required a different result.21  That is, 
product success could be dispositive for establishing secondary 
meaning in the Seventh Circuit.22  This is just one example of many 
where a court relies on an Eighth Circuit case to restrict extending 
trademark rights too far.  
III. INFRINGEMENT 
In American trademark jurisprudence, a trademark is infringed 
when a second comer uses a mark that is likely to cause confusion 
with the senior user’s mark.23  Each circuit court uses a different 
normative test for finding a likelihood of confusion.  Although all 
circuits’ tests are similar, distinctions remain.24 
The primary case in the Eighth Circuit regarding infringement is 
SquirtCo v. Seven-Up.25  Even though this case has only been cited once 
by the United States Supreme Court,26 SquirtCo has had the effect—at 
least in the Eighth Circuit—of restraining and resisting the wholesale 
expansion of trademark rights that one finds in other circuits.27 
SquirtCo is not a remarkable case.  In SquirtCo, the court applied 
six factors to conclude that QUIRST as used on lemonade by the 
Seven-Up Company infringed SQUIRT for soft drinks used by 
SquirtCo.  The factors were as follows: (1) the strength of the 
trademark, (2) the similarity between the trademark and the defen-
dant’s mark, (3) the competitive proximity of the products on which 
the respective marks are placed, (4) the intent of the alleged infringer 
to pass off his goods as those of the trademark holder, (5) the 
incidents of actual confusion, and (6) the degree of care likely to be 
exercised by potential customers of the trademark holder.28 
 
 21. See, e.g., Int’l Kennel Club of Chicago, Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 
1085 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating that secondary meaning is achieved if “most consumers” 
have associated it with a product). 
 22. See id. 
 23. 5-5 Anne Gilson Lalonde, Gilson on Trademarks § 5.01 (2009). 
 24. For an analysis of these distinctions, see Michael B. Landau, Problems 
Arising Out of the Use of WWW.TRADEMARK.COM: The Application of Principles 
of Trademark Law to Internet Domain Name Disputes, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 455, 520 
n.71 (1997). 
 25. 628 F.2d 1086 (8th Cir. 1980). 
 26. Elby’s Big Boy of Steubenville, Inc. v. Frisch’s Rest., Inc., 459 U.S. 916, 917 
(1982) (No. 81-2012) (White, J., dissenting from the denial of cert.). 
 27. Kenneth L. Port, William Mitchell College of Law, Mitchell Study on 
Trademark Litigation: Graph Q (2008), http://www.wmitchell.edu/intellectual-
property/files/WM-TMStudy-GraphQ.pdf. 
 28. SquirtCo, 628 F.2d at 1091. 
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What makes the SquirtCo case remarkable is that its application 
has resulted in an inherently rational infringement jurisprudence in 
the Eighth Circuit, where examples abound.  
In 1987, just seven years after SquirtCo, the Eighth Circuit decided 
against Kellogg in its attempt to enjoin General Mills’ use of 
OATMEAL RAISIN CRISP.29  Kellogg had first used and registered 
APPLE RAISIN CRISP.30  Obviously, the “raisin crisp” parts of the 
marks are identical.  Obviously, the parties are in close competition.  
However, in coming up with its rational result, the Eighth Circuit 
concluded that the mark APPLE RAISIN CRISP was a weak mark.31  As 
such, it deserved little protection.  The Eighth Circuit showed 
intellectual acumen when it also concluded that when the defendant’s 
mark is very similar or even identical, it does not mean that it 
automatically infringes the plaintiff’s mark.32  The court teaches that 
the overall look and feel of the mark should be analyzed to determine 
if one mark infringes another.33 
In this case, the lettering, the relative color schemes, and the box 
designs all differed.34  Therefore, the Eighth Circuit agreed with the 
district court that relevant consumers could easily discern the 
difference between the two marks and found that no infringement 
occurred.35  
As a further example of how the Eighth Circuit reaches a balance 
in the APPLE RAISIN CRISP case, the court never refers to the 
trademark as “property.”  Rather, the court explains, the trademark 
“represents intangible assets such as reputation and goodwill.”36  The 
court never uses the rhetoric of property that some courts use to 
support the conclusion that the plaintiff has been harmed somehow, 
even if that somehow might be rather nebulous.37  Many courts 
consider the trademark to be property and, therefore, cast the net far 
 
 29. General Mills, Inc. v. Kellogg Co., 824 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1987). 
 30. Id. at 624 (Kellogg began marketing the product in 1983, and obtained 
federal registration for the APPLE RAISIN CRISP mark in 1986). 
 31. Id. at 626 (holding that a mark is weak where “consumer confusion has been 
found unlikely because the mark’s components are so widely used that the public can 
easily distinguish slight differences in the marks, even if the goods are related”). 
 32. Id. at 627. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 628. 
 36. Id. at 625. 
 37. See generally Jerome Gilson & Anne Gilson LaLonde, The Lanham Act: Time for 
a Face Lift?, 92 TRADEMARK REP. 1013, 1013 (2002) (highlighting the general 
inconsistencies in judicial approaches across the circuits). 
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more broadly when explaining their justification for an injunction.38  
The defendant, they argue, has trespassed on the property of the 
plaintiff and, therefore, must cease.39  In the Eighth Circuit, this 
analysis is appropriately narrower.  If the right of exclusion has been 
damaged, then an injunction should issue.  Here, OATMEAL RAISIN 
CRISP does not interfere with Kellogg’s ability (or inability) to 
exclude others from using APPLE RAISIN CRISP and, therefore, the 
injunction is inappropriate.  All courts should be so rational. 
The Eighth Circuit has not always balanced this correctly.  In the 
MUTANT OF OMAHA case,40 the court found MUTANT OF OMAHA 
(as used on t-shirts) to infringe the insurance company, Mutual of 
Omaha.41  In a case that is clear parody and, as Judge Heaney argues 
in his dissent, “a significant intrusion upon the defendant’s first 
amendment rights,”42 the majority seems to use the property rationale 
mentioned above to enjoin the use of the mark on the defendant’s t-
shirts.43 
Judge Heaney is very articulate in establishing precisely why the 
property rationale should not be used to justify an injunction in 
trademark cases.44  According to Judge Heaney in his dissent, 
trademarks play a far different role in our society than real property.45  
Both sides in this case look to the so-called shopping mall cases, which 
allow the restriction of free speech on the personal property of 
another.46  The majority relies on this favorably.47  Judge Heaney 
 
 38. See Bishop v. Equinox Int’l Corp., 154 F.3d 1220, 1223 (10th Cir. 1998) 
(arguing that a trademark is a protectable property right); see also New Kids on the 
Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir. 1992) (arguing that a 
trademark is a “limited property right in a particular word, phrase or symbol”). 
 39. Layton Pure Food Co. v. Church & Dwight Co., 182 F. 24, 33 (8th Cir. 1910). 
 40. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987). 
 41. Id. (applying the SquirtCo analysis). 
 42. Id. at 406 (Heaney, J., dissenting). 
 43. Id. at 402 (majority opinion) (holding that a “failure to protect Mutual’s 
trademark rights would amount to an ‘unwarranted infringement of property rights,’ 
for it would ‘diminish [those] rights without significantly enhancing the asserted right 
of free speech’” (quoting Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972))). 
 44. Id. at 405 (Heaney, J., dissenting) (arguing that extending the definition of 
“property damages” to trademark damages claims, particularly when those claims 
involve “satiric appropriation,” only serves to “stifle[] creativity without protecting any 
legally recognized rights” (citing H. Dorsen, Satiric Appropriation and the Law of Libel, 
Trademark, and Copyright: Remedies Without Wrongs, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 923, 964 (1985))). 
 45. Id. at 405–06. 
 46. Id. at 402 (majority opinion) (citing Lloyd Corp, 407 U.S. at 567; Hanover 
Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916); Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. 
Wolf Bros., 240 U.S. 251, 259 (1916); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat 
Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1979)); id. at 405 (Heaney, J., dissenting). 
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correctly points out that a trademark is not property.48  A trademark 
itself is speech.  When the majority states that, like the shopping mall 
cases, it is acceptable to restrict speech as long as there is an alterna-
tive forum available to the defendant when the subject is a trademark, 
this analogy breaks down because, by definition, there is no alterna-
tive available to the trademark as the trademark itself is the speech 
being regulated.49  This line of analysis has been rather influential in 
other “trademark as parody” cases around the country.50  
Many successful infringement cases in the Eighth Circuit are 
more similar to the Kemp case.51  In Kemp, there was expert testimony 
that LOUIS KEMP, as used on frozen wild rice meals, was confusingly 
similar to LOUIS KEMP, as used on artificial crab products using 
surimi.52  The court actually reversed the judgment of the district 
court, which found no infringement.53  In this Eighth Circuit opinion, 
the court found that “[w]hen, as here, it is shown by an alleged 
infringer’s own salesman that even sophisticated professional buyers 
experienced actual confusion, such evidence supports a finding that 
confusion is likely.”54 
Most significantly for the question of balance of trademark rights, 
the Eighth Circuit has determined that trademark infringement—the 
“likelihood of infringement” question—is a question of fact,55 whereas 
many other circuits consider it to be a question of law.56  This 
 
 47. Id. at 402 (majority opinion) (arguing that precedent supports the position 
that the “property right” in the trademark must be protected, and should not yield to 
Novak’s right to expression under the First Amendment). 
 48. Id. at 405 (Heaney, J., dissenting). 
 49. Id. at 405–06 (citing Robert J. Shaughnessy, Trademark Parody: A Fair Use and 
First Amendment Analysis, 72 VA. L. REV. 1079, 1111–12 (1986)). 
 50. See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 
971 (10th Cir. 1996) (explaining that because trademarks are comprised of words, 
sounds, and images used to communicate, forbidding the use of particular words runs 
a substantial risk of suppressing ideas); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 
1989) (holding that the Lanham Act should apply “to artistic works only where the 
public interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the public interest in free 
expression”). 
 51. Kemp v. Bumble Bee Seafoods, Inc., 398 F.3d 1049 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 52. Id. at 1053. 
 53. Id. at 1058. 
 54. Id. 
 55. SquirtCo v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F. 2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding that 
any likelihood of confusion is a factual question); see also Sun Banks of Fla., Inc. v. Sun 
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 651 F.2d 311, 314–15 (5th Cir. 1981) (applying the “clearly 
erroneous” standard); Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 377 (1st Cir. 
1980) (also applying the “clearly erroneous” standard). 
 56. Alpha  Indus., Inc. v. Alpha Steel Tube & Shapes, Inc., 616 F.2d 440, 443–44 
(9th Cir. 1980) (finding likelihood of confusion to be a “legal test” reviewed de 
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distinction has very meaningful practical and theoretical effects.   
Practically, treating the likelihood of confusion as a question of 
fact means the jury’s determination on the issue will be disturbed only 
if there is clear and convincing evidence that the trial court made an 
error.57  Consequently, fewer appeals will succeed in overturning a 
district court opinion.  In the Eighth Circuit, therefore, the jury’s 
verdict is taken more seriously than in some other circuits.58   
Theoretically, this approach is significant because it is a comment 
on the larger and more normative role of the jury in federal trade-
mark cases.59  The jury will have a larger role in trademark infringe-
ment causes of action in the Eighth Circuit than in other circuits 
because the ultimate conclusion on infringement is a question of fact, 
not a question of law.  In circuits where the likelihood of infringe-
ment is a question of law, the jury’s role is minimized to finding facts 
that establish, or do not establish, each individual element of the 
infringement analysis.60  In the Eighth Circuit, the jury actually weighs 
the six SquirtCo factors in determining whether or not there has been 
an infringement.61  As such, the role of the jury in the Eighth Circuit 
is broader than in places such as the Second and Ninth circuits, where 
infringement is a question of law.62 
 
novo); Blue Bell, Inc. v. Jaymar-Ruby, Inc., 497 F.2d 433, 435 n.2 (2d Cir. 1974) 
(observing that the appellate court is “entitled to make [its] own assessment of the 
likelihood of confusion”). 
 57. 6 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 
32:133 (4th ed. 2009). 
 58. See, e.g., Everest Capital Ltd. v. Everest Funds Mgmt., L.L.C., 393 F.3d 755, 
760 (8th Cir. 2005) (arguing that a detailed analysis of the jury verdict with respect to 
each SquirtCo factor was unnecessary, as the issue is “particularly amenable to 
resolution by a jury . . . which represents a cross-section of consumers [and] is well-
suited to evaluating whether an ‘ordinary consumer’ would likely be confused” 
(quoting Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L & L Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 318 (4th Cir. 
1992))). 
 59. In patent law, for example, the Markman case greatly restricted juries from 
having input on claim construction.  See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 
U.S. 370, 391 (1996).  In the patent context, I am not commenting on whether this is 
a good development or a bad development.  In the trademark context, the exclusion 
of juries from what is an important societal and contextual issue (trademark 
infringement) is dangerous. 
 60. See Estee Lauder, Inc. v. The Gap, Inc., 108 F.3d 1503, 1509–12 (2d Cir. 
1997) (finding that while the trial court’s finding of likelihood of the confusion is one 
of fact, the court reviews the ultimate weighing of each factor de novo). 
 61. Everest Capital Ltd., 393 F.3d at 759–60. 
 62. The issue of what is the appropriate standard of review remains contentious.  
One commentator points out that even the legislative history of the Lanham Act is 
not clear on this point.  See Burton Jay Rubin, The Role of the Clearly Erroneous Standard 
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) in Reviewing Trial Court Determinations of Likelihood 
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For these reasons, SquirtCo has had a meaningful and lasting leg-
acy on the law of trademark infringement, both in the Eighth Circuit 
and beyond. 
IV. DILUTION 
The concept of trademark dilution has a tortured existence and 
justification in the United States.63  Trademark infringement, by 
definition, only happens when parties are in competition.64  However, 
what happens when the parties are not in competition, as with, for 
example, Kodak brand pianos or Buick brand aspirin? 
Trademark dilution stems from the facts of a trademark case in 
England in which the court found that KODAK branded bicycles 
lessened the distinctive capacity of Kodak on photographic supplies.65  
Commentators rely upon this case to simply and easily crystallize the 
apparent problem that dilutive conduct raises.66  In a version of this 
idea, KODAK brand pianos was even used in the legislative history of 
the United States Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1996.67  One 
theory is that these uses need to be enjoined to maintain the distinc-
tiveness of the famous mark.  To the extent there are KODAK brand 
products available that are not related to camera equipment and film, 
Kodak’s mark suffers.   
 
or No Likelihood of Confusion, 74 TRADEMARK REP. 20, 35 (1984) (arguing that the 
standard of review should be a question of law based on factual determinations).  For 
a more detailed discussion of the split among the circuits, see 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:73 (4th ed. 2009). 
 63. See generally David Welkowitz, Reexamining Trademark Dilution, 44 VAND. L. 
REV. 531, 533 (1991) (arguing that antidilution statutes are an “overly broad 
mechanism” for protecting trademark rights and grant “protection to those in least 
need of it”). 
 64. See Milton W. Handler, Are the State Antidilution Laws Compatible with the 
National Protection of Trademarks?, 75 TRADEMARK REP. 269, 271 (1985) (explaining how 
trademark protection was based on unfair competition law, and was developed in 
response to product sellers seeking to divert customers away from their competitors 
by using the same or similar mark on their products). 
 65. Eastman Photographic Materials Co. v. Kodak Cycle Co., (1898) 15 R.P.C. 
105 (High Ct. of Justice). 
 66. See, e.g., Monica Hof Wallace, Using the Past to Predict the Future: 
Refocusing the Analysis of a Federal Dilution Claim, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 945, 947–48 
(2005) (discussing brand dilution in the context of Eastman Photographic). 
 67. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006); see H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030; see also Amicus Curiae Brief of Intellectual Property 
Law Professors in Support of Respondents at 4, Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 
537 U.S. 418 (2003) (No. 01-1015) (“If a company could sell bicycles under the Kodak 
name, surely another could sell pizza, another gloves, and still another desks.  No 
longer could one refer to ‘Kodak’ without more . . . .’). 
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On the other hand, the Lanham Act is considered constitutional 
because it is based on Article I, section 8, clause 3 of the Constitu-
tion—the Commerce Clause.  Hence, there needs to be interstate 
commerce before there is commerce that Congress can regulate.  
There are no property rights in gross in a trademark.68  There is only 
the right to exclude to the extent the senior uses the mark and for as 
long as the senior uses the mark.  Dilution upsets this balance of 
rights and creates a property right in the mark itself.  As such, the 
notion of dilution is arguably unconstitutional.69 
Since there are only five reported Eighth Circuit cases regarding 
federal trademark dilution,70 the data set is small.  Some preliminary 
conclusions, however, are possible.  The conclusions that are available 
fit the theme of this article.  The Eighth Circuit has a very balanced 
approach to trademark dilution rights.  The best example of this may 
be a single quotation from Luigino’s, Inc. v. Stouffer Corp.: 
Trademark law does not give Stouffer the exclusive right to 
use a mark that consumers associate with tasty, low-fat frozen 
entrees, however. To succeed on its claim, Stouffer was re-
quired to offer evidence that the “Michelina’s Lean ‘N Tas-
ty” mark causes consumers to associate the “Lean Cuisine” 
mark with something other than Stouffer’s frozen entrees.  
Because Stouffer did not do this, its trademark dilution 
claim must fail.71 
Stouffer’s had argued that the word “cuisine” means that a food 
product tastes good.72  Therefore, when comparing the sound, 
meaning, and appearance of the marks, LEAN ‘N TASTY means the 
same thing as LEAN CUISINE.73  Therefore, Stouffer argued, the 
marks are synonymous for dilution purposes.74  The Eighth Circuit 
rejected that argument.   
 
 68. See Kenneth Port, The “Unnatural” Expansion of Trademark Rights: Is a Federal 
Dilution Statute Necessary?, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS.  J. 433 (1994) (“[N]o courts have 
recognized property rights to the mark itself.”). 
 69. See Kristan Friday, Does Dilution Make Trademarks Into Unconstitutional Patents?, 
12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 180 (2001) (arguing that dilution protection regimes are 
unconstitutional). 
 70. Everest Capital Ltd. v. Everest Funds Mgmt., L.L.C., 393 F.3d 755 (8th Cir. 
2005); Frosty Treats, Inc. v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am., Inc., 426 F.3d 1001 (8th Cir. 
2005); Luigino’s, Inc. v. Stouffer Corp., 170 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 1999); Viacom Inc. v. 
Ingram Enter., Inc., 141 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 1998); Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Rauh 
Rubber, Inc., 130 F.3d 1305 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 71. Luigino’s, 170 F.3d. at 833. 
 72. Id. at 830. 
 73. Id. at 830–31. 
 74. Id. at 832. 
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The court is clearly concerned about granting any rights to the 
word “lean” in gross.  The court expressly rejected this by calling the 
term “lean” descriptive.  However, a descriptive word with as much 
secondary meaning as LEAN CUISINE obviously possesses is appro-
priately protected as a strong trademark in the United States.75  Simply 
because “lean” also has a descriptive meaning, that should not lessen 
the mark’s protection.76  Luigino’s conceded, as they must, that LEAN 
CUISINE was famous.77  Therefore, whether the mark is descriptive or 
strong should not have been an issue for this court.  By referring to 
the term “lean” pejoratively as a descriptive mark, the court shows its 
true feelings about dilution.  This court will be very careful about 
expanding the trademark right to include dilution. 
Of all the trademark dilution cases the court could have relied 
upon, this court chose to rely on Mead Data v. Toyota78 from the 
Second Circuit.  This is strange because Mead Data is the best example 
of a court shying away from applying the clear language of a state 
dilution statute to a situation that was clearly dilutive.79  There, Toyota 
adopted the LEXUS mark in clear contradiction to Mead Data’s 
LEXIS mark.80  The court made the implausible conclusion that those 
two words were not similar enough to apply the New York State 
dilution statute.81  That is, when the Eighth Circuit cited as authority a 
case that came to an implausible outcome to avoid applying the 
dilution statute, one might wonder why.  What is it about dilution that 
gives the Eighth Circuit so much concern that they reach to the 
Second Circuit applying the State of New York’s dilution law (not the 
Federal Trademark Dilution Act) in an unbelievable manner?  I 
suggest that the Eighth Circuit shares the Second Circuit’s concern 
about dilution as expressed in the Mead Data case.  It simply goes too 
far as written, and to keep balance in Eighth Circuit trademark 
jurisprudence, dilution will be narrowly circumscribed. 
It appears that the logic of Stouffer is stretched in a similar man-
ner as it was stretched in Mead Data to avoid applying the dilution 
statute.  To conclude that no rights can be obtained to the descriptive 
 
 75. See id. at 830. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 832. 
 78. Mead Data v. Toyota, 875 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 79. See, e.g., Port, The “Unnatural” Expansion of Trademark Rights: Is a Federal 
Dilution Statute Necessary?, supra note 68, at 449–54 (discussing the Second Circuit’s 
“extremely hostile” treatment of the concept of dilution in Mead Data v. Toyota).  
 80. See Mead Data, 875 F.2d 1026. 
 81. Id. at 1028–32. 
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word “lean” after the parties stipulated to the famous nature of that 
mark is disingenuous.   
Stouffer teaches that trademark dilution will not be openly re-
ceived by the Eighth Circuit.  It illustrates that dilution will be closely 
scrutinized because the Eighth Circuit is concerned about extending 
the trademark right too far.  Granting Stouffer a right in gross to the 
word “lean,” as the dilution doctrine would have us do—descriptive or 
not—seems to go too far for the Eighth Circuit and its sense of 
balance and fair play. 
An even better example of the Eighth Circuit’s focus on fairness 
is Viacom Inc. v. Ingram Enterprises.82  Viacom concerned Ingram’s use of 
the word BLOCKBUSTER on fireworks.83  Viacom claimed this use 
diluted its trademark BLOCKBUSTER for use on movie rental 
services.84  The conduct complained of began before passage of the 
Federal Trademark Dilution Act in 1996.85  The district court had 
dismissed the case on ground that application of the FTDA in this 
case would be impermissibly retroactive.86 
The Eighth Circuit agreed that the case should be dismissed, but 
expounded on the significance of fairness in our trademark system.87  
The Eighth Circuit pointed out that the conduct complained of by 
Viacom was legal when it occurred.88  As such, Ingram, for two years, 
engaged in legal conduct and even created “property” in and to the 
BLOCKBUSTER mark as used on fireworks.89  That fact must be 
properly balanced, the court determined, when considering the 
retroactive application of the FTDA.90  The Eighth Circuit was not 
convinced that the court could adequately balance those rights and 
dismissed the case.91  Therefore, the dilution cases of the Eighth 
Circuit also point to a very balanced trademark jurisprudence.   
V. INCONTESTABILITY 
Subject to some exceptions, a registered trademark is incontest-
 
 82. Viacom Inc. v. Ingram Enters., Inc., 141 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 83. Id.  
 84. Id. at 888. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 889–90. 
 88. Id. at 890. 
 89. Id.  
 90. Id. at 889–90. 
 91. See id. at 890–92. 
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able when two factors are met.92  First, the registrant must have 
continuously used its mark with the goods for which the mark was 
registered for five continuous years after the date of registration.93  
Second, within one year after the end of any such five-year period, the 
registrant must have filed an affidavit attesting to such five years of 
continuous use as well as to current use.94  A mark’s attainment of 
incontestable status, or incontestability, is “conclusive evidence of the 
validity of the registered mark and of the registration of the mark, of 
the registrant’s ownership of the mark, and of the registrant’s 
exclusive right to use the registered mark in commerce.”95 
Incontestability in trademark jurisprudence differs from circuit to 
circuit.96  The Eighth Circuit agrees with the Seventh Circuit in that 
incontestability confers important rights on and to the trademark 
holder, but this has no bearing on the strength of the mark analysis 
for purposes of whether a mark is infringed.97   
All circuits recognize the clear language of section 33 of the Lan-
ham Act.98  That is, all circuits find incontestability to mean that the 
registration is conclusive evidence of the holder’s exclusive rights to 
use the mark on the identified goods.99  The circuits are split on 
whether incontestable status affects the strength of the mark analysis.  
In the Eleventh Circuit, an incontestable mark is presumed strong for 
purposes of infringement analysis.100  In the Eighth Circuit, incontest-
able status is important, but is less significant than in the Eleventh 
Circuit. 
One example of its importance is an interesting procedural ad-
vantage in obtaining incontestable status.  One panel in the Eighth 
Circuit has held that filing a Section 15 Affidavit with the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and changing the status of 
 
 92. See Lanham Act § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (2008). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. § 33(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b). 
 96. Kenneth L. Port, The Illegitimacy of Trademark Incontestability, 26 IND. L. REV. 
519, 548–52 (1993). 
 97. Id. at 551 (citing Munters Corp. v. Matsui Am., Inc. 909 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 
1990)). 
 98. Under section 33, incontestable status is “conclusive evidence of the validity 
of the registered mark and of the registration of the mark, of the registrant’s 
ownership of the mark, and of the registrant’s exclusive right to use the registered 
mark in commerce.” Lanham Act § 33(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (2008). 
 99. See id. 
 100. Port, The Illegitimacy of Trademark Incontestability, supra note 96, at 550 (citing 
Dieter v. B&H Indus. of Sw. Fla., 880 F.2d 322, 329 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 
U.S. 950 (1990)). 
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the mark from a contestable to an incontestable mark is such a 
significant change of circumstances that issue preclusion would not 
bar a plaintiff from suing a defendant twice for the same conduct.101  
In this case, the plaintiff had sued and lost a trademark infringement 
cause of action because its mark, SEALTITE, was determined to be 
merely descriptive.102  Subsequent to that decision, the plaintiff’s mark 
became incontestable and it sued the defendant a second time for the 
same use.  The Eighth Circuit held: 
Here, we are not concerned with the mere passage of time.  
Instead, we are faced with a question of whether a change in 
a mark’s validity from contestable to incontestable bars ap-
plication of collateral estoppel.  We hold that this constitutes 
a significant intervening factual change, and, therefore, ap-
plication of collateral estoppel is inappropriate.103 
It is not clear from the case that the Eighth Circuit is aware of 
how simple it is to obtain incontestable status with the PTO.  One 
merely files a Section 15 Affidavit.104  It is not substantively reviewed.105  
The claim of continued use is presumed to be accurate.106  In this case, 
the defendant had conceded that the mark was incontestable.107  The 
Eighth Circuit’s opinion gives holders of contestable marks who face a 
determination that their mark is descriptive and unenforceable two 
bites at the apple.108  Such a trademark holder is allowed to sue the 
same defendant for the same conduct: once before the mark has 
become incontestable and once after.  All this based on a very simple 
 
 101. B&B  Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 569 F.3d 383, 388 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 102. B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 252 F.3d 1010, 1012 (8th Cir. 
2001). 
 103. B&B Hardware, 569 F.3d at 388. 
 104. Lanham Act § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (2006). 
 105. See id.  
 106. Id. 
 107. B&B Hardware, 569 F.3d at 389. 
 108. By merely filing a Section 15 Affidavit with the PTO, the registrant can claim 
incontestability.  U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1605 (6th ed. 2009), available at 
http://tess2.uspto.gov/tmdb/tmep/.  The PTO does not accept the filing or the 
claim to incontestable status.  Id.  The filing merely perfects the right to later claim 
the mark is incontestable before a court of law.  Id.  Therefore, there is no procedure 
that a prevailing defendant can take to object to the Section 15 Affidavit while under 
review by the PTO.  The only time to object is during subsequent litigation that would 
be allowed under the court’s ruling in the B&B Hardware case.  That is, the case, once 
brought by the non-prevailing plaintiff, would have to be defended against a second 
time.  The prevailing defendant could not rely on collateral estoppel to ward off a 
second lawsuit. 
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filing of one form with the PTO and paying one fee of $200.109 
This is an amazing advantage for a mere $200.  Giving a plaintiff 
two bites at the apple and casting aside the venerable notion of 
collateral estoppel because of such a simple filing is an example of the 
Eighth Circuit forgetting its otherwise balanced trademark jurispru-
dence. 
VI. DATA 
The available data supports the conclusion that the Eighth Cir-
cuit is a balanced venue to review trademark decisions.   
Graph A depicts an interesting trend that was recognized in the 
early 1980s in the United States in general.110  In the 1980s, there was 
a remarkable rise in incidents of trademark disputes.111  The rise 
appears in Graph A as the peak of trademark cases before the Eighth 
Circuit reached six in 1987.  The rise is followed by a slow decline in 
incidents of trademark litigation.  This downward trend is also 
reflected in national data.112Most importantly, Graph A shows that on 
 
 109. 37 C.F.R. § 2.6(a)(13) (2008). 
 110. See KENNETH L. PORT, Graph A: Total Number of Reported Cases Per Year, in 
MITCHELL STUDY ON TRADEMARK LITIGATION (2009), http://www.wmitchell.edu/
intellectual-property/files/WM-TMStudy-GraphA.pdf (graphically illustrating data 
based on the Mitchell Study on Trademark Litigation’s data on all terminally-
adjudicated, reported trademark decisions since July 5, 1947).  
 111. See id. 
 112. See id. 
Graph A: Total Number of Reported Cases Per Year
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average, approximately one trademark case a year is heard by the 
Eighth Circuit.  Just as the national trend indicated,113 nearly 70% of 
all reported cases in the Eighth Circuit occurred after 1980 (forty-
three of sixty-three cases). 
Graph B shows that the defendant prevails 62% of the time in the 
Eighth Circuit.  The national average is that the defendant prevails 
only 50% of the time.114  Therefore, a defendant has a far greater 
chance of success in the Eighth Circuit than the nation at large.   
Graph C shows in very clear detail that trademark litigation in the 
Eighth Circuit spiked after 1980.  For the thirty-three years the 
Lanham Act was in effect prior to this spike, the number of cases was 
rather constant.115  After 1980, the total number of cases heard by the 
 
 113. See id. 
 114. See KENNETH L. PORT, Graph B: Total Infringement Claims Established/Not Est-
ablished, in MITCHELL STUDY ON TRADEMARK LITIGATION (2009), 
http://www.wmitchell.edu/intellectual-property/files/WM-TMStudy-GraphB.pdf.  
 115. See PORT, Graph A: Total Number of Reported Cases Per Year, supra note 110.  
Graph B: Total Infringement Claims Established/Not Established 
Graph C: Infringement Claims Established/Not Established by Decade 
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Eighth Circuit rose at an astonishing rate.  By decade, in the early 
years of the Lanham Act, the Eighth Circuit would hear five, eight, or 
seven cases.  After 1980, by decade, the court heard eighteen and 
seventeen cases respectively.  This is more than a 200% increase in ten 
years.   
Also telling is that prior to 1980, trademark plaintiffs won most of 
the time.  After 1980, trademark plaintiffs lost most of the time.  In 
the 1980s, trademark plaintiffs lost twice as often as they won; in the 
1990s, trademark plaintiffs lost more than three times more often 
than they won.  There is only data available through 2007, but this 
decade and 2010 are also on track for plaintiffs losing more than 
three times more often than they win.  
Until 1980, trademark plaintiffs prevailed more than 50% of the 
time.  Since 1980, trademark plaintiffs have prevailed 24% of the 
time.  That is, the number of incidents of trademark cases being 
reviewed by the Eighth Circuit went up significantly after 1980, but 
the numbers of times the plaintiffs prevailed did not. 
Graph E establishes this trend by year rather than by decade.  
Until the 1980s, there was relative symmetry in the win/lose ratio.  
After 1980, the data becomes significantly skewed in favor of trade-
mark plaintiffs losing. 
Graph D: Total Reported Claims of Infringement Per Year
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Graph F shows that trademark plaintiffs who demand an injunc-
tion succeed more often than trademark plaintiffs who claim 
infringement.  Forty-one percent of trademark plaintiffs receive their 
injunction when reviewed by the Eighth Circuit compared to 24% of 
trademark infringement plaintiffs.  Graph G depicts this trend by 
decade.  Once again, we see, just as in the trademark infringement 
data, that the number of demands increased post-1980, but the 
number of times the trademark plaintiff prevailed in obtaining the 
injunction did not.  Graph H depicts this by year.  Once again, there 
is a huge spike in the number of claims in the 1980s and a precipitous 
drop off of claims in recent years.  In fact, since 2000, not a single 
reported trademark case demanded an injunction.  
Graph J shows that there have been only three cases where dam-
ages have been received in the sixty-year history of the Lanham Act in 
the Eighth Circuit.  Even though a mere 4.9% of all cases reported are 
in the Eighth Circuit, this percentage is very close to the national 
Graph E: Infringement Claims Established or Not Established Per Year 
Graph F: Percentage of Injunction Claims Granted or Denied
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average of all cases.116  Graph J also shows that a significant award of 
damages is truly rare.  In 1981, one reported case affirmed a finding 
of over $3 million in damages.  The other two awards were for $7500 
and $250,000.  Therefore, significant damage awards in the Eighth 
Circuit seem to be truly rare. 
From an overall perspective, several conclusions seem possible 
regarding the data of trademark litigation in the Eighth Circuit.  First, 
and most obviously, the Eighth Circuit is perfectly normal compared 
to the nation regarding both the frequency of damage awards and the 
amount of damage awards.  Second, the Eighth Circuit is also on par 
with the nation when it reflects a large increase in both trademark 
infringement claims and demands for injunctions post-1980.  Third, 
compared to the entire nation, trademark plaintiffs prevail far less 
frequently in the Eighth Circuit.  In the entire nation, trademark 
plaintiffs prevail fifty percent of the time.  In the Eighth Circuit, they 
prevail only twenty-four percent of the time.  Therefore, trademark 
plaintiffs prevail less frequently in the Eighth Circuit than in other 
circuits, but when they do prevail they obtain damage awards at the 
same rate as any trademark plaintiff in other circuits. 
 
 116. See KENNETH L. PORT, Mitchell Study on Trademark Litigation Data Spreadsheet, in 
MITCHELL STUDY ON TRADEMARK LITIGATION (2009), http://www.wmitchell.edu/
intellectual-property/files/Mitchell-Study-on-Trademark-Litigation-data.xls 
(containing 145 cases out of 2762 total cases with damages awarded). 
Graph G: Claims for an Injunction Granted/Denied by Decade 
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Graph H: Total Number of Claims for an Injunction Per Year 
 
 
Graph J: Total Damages Awarded Per Year (Inflation-Adjusted to 2007 Dollars) 
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VII.  ECONOMIC RECOVERY 
The Eighth Circuit’s trademark jurisprudence is measured and 
rational.  It is far more difficult to find a trademark infringed in the 
Eighth Circuit than in the United States generally.  Although the 
Eighth Circuit does provide a remarkable procedural advantage to 
trademark incontestability,117 it openly addresses fairness when 
refusing to enjoin allegedly dilutive conduct.118  This leads one to the 
conclusion that the trademark right in the Eighth Circuit is not 
dominated by large corporations.  This is a circuit where large 
corporations do not prevail merely because they are large corpora-
tions.  Rather, the defendant’s rights, whether a large corporation or 
not, are fairly balanced against the plaintiff’s rights.  This has a 
positive effect on competition. 
Competition is, obviously, the cornerstone to the American 
economy.119  It is precisely this competition that will lead the United 
States out of recession and back into growth.120  This competition is 
facilitated by the Eighth Circuit when it resists attempts to make the 
trademark system by, for, and with large corporate players.  Instead, in 
the Eighth Circuit, the legitimate trademark rights are maintained.  
However, extensions of the trademark right are not encouraged.   
Therefore, although the data is limited, trademark dilution seems 
to have had a hard time getting traction in the Eighth Circuit where 
judges seem to be very hesitant to apply the dilution statute as written.  
One has to wonder why.  Especially when the Eighth Circuit cites the 
extreme case of Lexis not diluting Lexus because the marks are not 
 
 117. See B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 569 F.3d 383, 388 (8th Cir. 
2009) (holding that attaining incontestable status is a significant event such that issue 
preclusion does not bar a plaintiff from filing suit twice against same allegedly-
infringing conduct).  See generally supra Part V (discussing incontestability in the 
Eighth Circuit and other circuits). 
 118. See generally supra Part IV (discussing the Eighth Circuit’s treated of dilution 
claims). 
 119. See, e.g., Kenneth M. Davidson, Creating Effective Competition Institutions: Ideas 
for Transitional Economies, 6 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 71 (2005) (discussing America’s 
long and diverse experience with competition law, and competition in general, within 
a greater discussion of how competition laws may benefit transitional economies).  In 
particular, “as the country with the longest and probably widest experience with 
competition law, America’s successes and failures provide lessons for any competition 
law.”  Id. at 74. 
 120. Lee E. Ohanian, Good Policies Can Save the Economy, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 2008, 
at A17 (“Will we duck a depression?  We will if the principles of economic growth—
increasing the incentives to work and save, promoting competition, and fostering 
economic openness—are maintained. This is the most important lesson we learned, 
the hard way, from the 1930s.”). 
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similar enough,121 the point becomes a bit more conspicuous.  The 
Eighth Circuit will not expand trademark rights that will interfere 
with basic notions of competition.   
In Luigino’s, Inc. v. Stouffer Corp.,122 when the court holds that 
Stouffer does not have a monopoly right in the word “lean,”123 it is 
saying precisely this.  To allow Stouffer to monopolize “lean” would 
provide an unnecessary competitive advantage to Stouffer.  Trade-
mark rights, according to the Eighth Circuit, are important tools for 
trademark holders and those attempting to compete fairly.  To give 
Stouffer such a broad monopoly to the word “lean” would give them 
more than they need to compete fairly.  Trademarks, after all, should 
be awarded to the entity that first uses them in commerce and which 
consumers come to associate with that source or origin.124  More is not 
needed.  To give more would upset the fine line between exclusion 
and monopoly.125  The Eighth Circuit seems to understand this.  As 
such, the circuit has pursued a very fair and balanced trademark 
jurisprudence in the last sixty years. 
 
 121. Luigino’s, Inc. v. Stouffer Corp., 170 F.3d 827, 832 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing 
Mead Data v. Toyota, 875 F.2d 1026, 1029 (2d Cir. 1989)). 
 122. 170 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 123. See id. at 833. 
 124. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Extortion: The End of Trademark Law, 65 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 585 (2008) (alleging an expansion of trademark rights based on 
extortion-like activity as opposed to use in commerce as the Constitution and the 
Lanham Act require). 
 125. See generally Port, The Unnatural Expansion of Trademark Rights: Is a Federal 
Dilution Statute Necessary?, supra note 68 (concluding that the then-proposed dilution 
statute, now codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c), would upset this fine line).  “[B]ecause 
there is no serious philosophical grounding for dilution and because of the practical 
problems presented by section 43(c), a federal dilution statute is not only unnecessary 
but also counter-productive to clear, rational consideration of legitimate trademark 
concerns.”  Id. at 436. 
